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Abstract 
In this paper, we set out to examine how individual and organizational benefits are created 
in virtual communities characterized by competitive relationships. Drawing insights from 
value theory, we argue that individual benefits arise from the use value/satisfaction that 
users gain from their participation in such communities, whereas organizational benefits 
are derived from the aggregate monetary value that is created through competition among 
users, also understood as exchange value. Moreover, we hypothesize that the ways in which 
users compete and the level of rivalry among users influence the aforementioned types of 
value creation. We test our hypotheses in the context of a self-developed mobile application 
that serves as an auctioning platform for hotel rooms. A preliminary analysis grants initial 
support to our hypotheses. Our research contributes to the relevant literature by 
highlighting the diverse benefits that competitive relationships can bring and paves the way 
for further research on alternative community models. 
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Introduction 
With virtual communities (henceforth VCs) playing an increasingly important role in the production and 
consumption of information, it should come as no surprise that research on VCs already has significantly 
advanced for nearly two decades. A virtual community is an aggregation of individuals who interact 
around a shared interest, where the interaction is at least partially supported and/or mediated by 
technology (Porter 2004). The VC literature has identified a multitude of formats, such as communities 
that focus on advancing members’ social interests or those promoting commercially oriented objectives 
(cf. Porter and Donthu 2008). Nonetheless, an underlying premise of most studies is that communities 
are formed through collaborative relationships between community members. Most studies on VCs tend 
to focus on how collaboration increases the individual and the collective/organizational benefits of the 
community and thus ensures its sustainability (Bieber et al. 2002; Sutanto et al. 2011). 
While this paper is driven by the existing research on VCs, at the same time we seek to complement this 
line of research by arguing that community relationships need not necessarily be characterized by a 
collaborative format, but can also consist of competitive relationships among members. Assuming that 
communities of all kinds are becoming an increasingly pertinent element of social life, obtaining a better 
understanding of how individual and organizational benefits are derived in this context is of particular 
importance.  
This paper attempts to achieve this, initially by drawing insights from recent advancements in value 
theory. Specifically, we argue that individual benefits are derived through use value, whereas 
organizational benefits are derived via the creation of exchange value. We elaborate on these concepts in 
the following section. Moreover, we argue that the extent to which such value is created in VCs is 
dependent on the structural characteristics of the community, namely the form, as well as the amount of 
rivalry among users.  
We examine these concepts in the empirical context of a self-developed mobile application that serves as 
an auctioning platform for hotel rooms. Our research consists of (1) a survey that we initially conducted in 
order to inquire about users’ attitudes towards booking hotel rooms via an online bidding platform, (2) a 
lab experiment where we test our main hypotheses, which we describe in the next section of the paper, 
and finally (3) an upcoming field experiment that will be conducted in order to overcome some of the 
limitations associated with the lab experiment. Our research provides an examination of a new set of 
relationships that can characterize competitive VCs, as well as an initial set of hypotheses that posit how 
such communities can be sustained. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Prior to elaborating on our theoretical framework, it is important to establish some definitions for our 
study. We define the individual benefit of a VC member as the reward the member receives from being 
part of and interacting with the community. As an example, in the case of a knowledge-sharing VC, a 
member’s direct benefit will be the answers to his/her posted questions. In contrast, the benefit of all 
members represents the organizational benefit, where ‘organization’ refers to the entity encapsulating the 
VC. In the aforementioned example, more involved collaboration between the members would increase 
the success of the virtual platform and the quality of questions and answers. 
Expecting to identify an increase of individual benefits in a competitive setting could seem as counter-
intuitive, as such a setting can only have one (or a group of) winner(s), and one’s loss can hardly lead to an 
increase of individual benefits. For example, in the context of auctioning, there are examples of bidders 
who repeatedly return to the same community (Yen and Lu 2008), which in turn raises the possibility 
they do benefit from participating regardless of what the outcome is. Herschlag and Zwick (2008) list the 
following reasons for participating in online auctions: addiction to excitement, competition with rivals, 
and the need for belonging to a community.  
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Value Theory 
In an attempt to better understand how such benefits can be derived in a VC setting, we draw some 
insights from value theory, and more specifically from the key distinction between use and exchange 
value. According to Lepak et al. (2007), use value refers to the specific quality of a new job, task, product, 
or service as perceived by users in relation to their needs, such as the speed or quality of performance on a 
new task or the aesthetics or performance features of a new product or service. As Bowman and 
Ambrosini (2000) note, such judgments are subjective and individual-specific. In contrast, exchange 
value is defined as either the monetary amount realized at a certain point in time, when the exchange of 
the new task, good, service, or product takes place, or the amount paid by the user to the seller for the use 
value of the focal task, job, product, or service (Lepak et al. 2007: 181-182). 
We argue that the use vs. exchange value distinction can be helpful for understanding the diverse benefits 
that can occur in a VC setting. The concept of use value can serve as a valid proxy for individual benefits 
because use value is subjective and the sum of individual financial benefits in a community setting that is 
characterized by competitive relationships cannot be positive, in the sense that one’s gain is someone 
else’s loss. Similarly, the concept of exchange value can be seen as a proxy for the organizational benefits 
that can accrue in a competitive VC, meaning that the accrual of organizational benefits in a community 
can occur when the aggregate exchange value is higher than it would be in the case where relationships 
among users are not characterized by an element of competition, but rather situations where the 
allocation process is either cooperatively resolved or require no coordination. As a result, our first 
hypothesis is the following:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Competitive relationships between users in a VC are positively related to the use and 
exchange value that is accrued in the community.  
How Users Compete and the Amount of Rivalry Among Users 
While we initially hypothesize that competition among users of a community holds benefits for individual 
users, as well as for the community in general, we also contend that the particular ways in which users 
compete will affect the value creation process. In line with studies that have shown how different 
exchange mechanisms can lead to diverse outcomes in terms of the tangible and intangible that users can 
accrue (Kersten et al. 2008), we draw our insights from the literature on continuing IS use, which refers to 
the concept of habitual use to explain how people react to new systems or to changes in existing systems 
(Ortiz de Guinea and Markus 2009). Accordingly, the argument explains how IS usage is not guided by 
the individual’s intentions when its use has become habitual, thus leading to sub-optimal outcomes.  
In this paper we also set out to contrast such habitual forms of usage with more efficient forms of usage, 
especially since the logic of efficiency has been conceived as a key factor for value creation (Amit and Zott 
2001). The diversity between habitual and more efficient manifestations of competitive behavior can be 
best illustrated in the context of online auctioning, which we also adopt as our research setting. Successful 
online auction platforms are primarily based on the ascending bid (English) auction type (Klemperer 
2002). People might more readily adopt a system (e.g. a particular auction type) if they have already used 
a similar system before.  
The claim mentioned above is also supported by Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004) who find evidence 
that bidders prefer ascending-bid auctions when given a choice. However, in the case of perishable goods, 
descending bid (Dutch) auctions have evolved to be the auction of choice because the price model mirrors 
the declining value of the goods over time (Rockoff and Groves 1995). Dutch auctions are also a 
convenient choice for commodities auctions as successful bidders have the option to nominate divisions of 
the offered goods. As a result, we argue that the use of the two auction types can either be based on a logic 
of efficiency or a logic of habitual use/ease of use. Accordingly, we hypothesize that all forms of 
competition have a positive effect on value creation, we expect more efficient competing forms to provide 
additional benefits to their communities: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). Forms of competing based on habitual use are positively related to the use and 
exchange value created in a VC.  
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). Forms of competing based on a logic of efficiency are positively related to the use 
and exchange value created in a VC. 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). When compared to habitual forms of competing, competition based on a logic of 
efficiency will lead to higher use and exchange value in a VC. 
In a final hypothesis set, we expect that the amount of rivalry among users in a community will inversely 
affect the amount of use exchange value that is created in a community. More specifically:  
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). The amount of rivalry among users is negatively related to the use value created 
in a VC.  
Hypothesis 4b (H4b). The amount of rivalry among users is positively related to the exchange value 
created in a VC.  
 
Research Design 
As was already noted in the introductory section, we seek to test the previously outlined hypotheses in the 
context of online auctioning for hotel rooms. For this purpose, we developed a mobile application and 
conducted a lab experiment with student subjects. In order to strengthen the validity of our results, we 
conducted a pre-experiment survey to identify any additional critical factors that affect user behavior 
when using such an application. We are also conducting a field experiment using the same mobile 
application in order to address some of the limitations of the design of this (and any) lab experiment. 
Currently, we are in a position to report the results of the pre-experiment survey and some initial results 
from the lab experiment. Nevertheless, we are confident that we can present the full model coming from 
the lab experiment, as well as some introductory results from the field experiment by September, 2014. In 
the rest of this paper, we elaborate on the design of the aforementioned complementary studies.  
Study 1 - Pre-Experiment Survey 
To answer the question of individual benefit within competitive VCs such as online auctions, we have 
designed a survey to measure the perceived satisfaction with the outcome of an online hotel reservation 
auction.  
The survey was evenly distributed to the USA, Germany, and China, the countries with the highest 
economic power in their respective economic regions: Americas, Europe, and Asia. The entire survey was 
translated into the official language of each country, was distributed online in the same format to all 
participants, and was filled out in the period 22-23 October 2013. Table 1 lists demographic data of the 
survey.  
 
 
Figure Value 
Total Respondents 399 
From the USA 136 
From Germany 132 
From China 131 
Male/Female 40%/60% 
Average Age (approx. Gaussian distribution) 31-40 
Median Education Bachelor’s 
Degree 
       Table 1. Survey Demographic Data 
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variables captured are the expected satisfaction of using the auctioning system (2 Likert-
scale items) and the intention to use the system (2 “Yes/No” items). The satisfaction scale was adapted 
from Yen and Lu (2008), who have in turn developed their items from Oliver’s (1980), as well as 
Bhattacherjee and Premkumar’s (2004) satisfaction scales.  
Independent Variables  
In order to determine the variables best suited as independent variables, we analyzed the user’s 
experience with the circumstances presented to him: online auctions of hotel bookings. In order to 
examine the acceptance, use and experience of online auctions we turned to the unified theory of 
acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) [Venkatesh et al. 2003] and used it as a basis for developing 
our constructs. We adapted these items into the context of auctioning, therefore this group of IVs includes 
items that relate to (1) incentives to use an auctioning system, (2) experience with auctions, (3) social 
influence, and, (4) habitual use of auctioning systems In order to characterize the experience with hotel 
bookings, we synthetized the results of several studies in the field of tourism and conducted two focus 
group studies. The variables that we included in our model include (1) the cognitive distance associated 
with a particular destination, (2) trip duration, and, (3) date flexibility. 
Control Variables 
We encapsulated several types of control variables in the study that should help isolate the effects of the 
independent variables. Most prominently, we used a set of items developed with the intention of 
controlling personality and culture characteristics. The personality and culture items were derived from 
the work of John et al. (2008) - called the Big Five Inventory - and included a well-known set of items for 
determining the global personality traits of the respondents. The items include extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness to experience.  
We also controlled for personality traits, which could potentially have a direct impact on the perceived 
satisfaction with the use of an unpredictable booking method: uncertainty avoidance and long-term 
orientation. Both were adapted from Yoo et al. (2011), based on Hofstede (1984). Last, we used gender 
and age demographic controls.  
Construct Reliability 
The reliability of the constructs is shown in Table 2. The reliability was measured for all items that are 
included in the experiment and have more than one item measuring each construct. All constructs have 
Composite Reliability of over 0.7 and AVE of over 0.5. Most of the constructs have a Cronbach Alpha 
value higher than 0.7, however three of the control variable constructs (Agreeableness, Conscientiousness 
and Long Term Orientation) have a value below the threshold of 0.7 (highlighted in Table 3). Given that 
the other two measurements, Composite Reliability and AVE are satisfactory for the variables in question, 
and that the Cronbach Alpha values are close to 0.7, we have decided to retain them for data analysis.  
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 Incentive 0.92 0.94 0.72 
Experience 0.87 0.94 0.88 
Social Influence 0.86 0.94 0.88 
Habit 0.81 0.92 0.84 
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 Extraversion 0.82 0.89 0.73 
Agreeableness 0.62 0.84 0.72 
Conscientious-
ness 
0.66 0.82 0.71 
Neuroticism 0.78 0.77 0.64 
Openness to 
Experience 
0.81 0.89 0.73 
P
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a
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ty
 Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
0.82 0.89 0.74 
Long Term 
Orientation 
0.53 0.81 0.68 
Table 2. Construct Reliability 
 
 
 
Results 
In order to analyze the results of the survey and to address the question of what influences the perceived 
satisfaction with the use of an online auctioning system for booking hotel reservations, we conducted a 
regression analysis. 
Satisfaction is the dependent variable measured with Likert scales from 1 to 5, where only the extreme 
choices were labeled (Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree, respectively). As only the extremes are 
labeled, we assume proportional hazards, hence we used an ordinal logistic regression model. To confirm 
our results (Table 3), we also ran the same model with comparable results  (the linear regression exhibited 
an R2 of 0.46, Adjusted-R2 of 0.44 and Root MSE of 0.74).   
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Expected 
Satisfaction 
Coef. Std. 
Err.  
z 
IV Auctioneer Profile 
Incentive 0.543 0.164 3.31 ** 
Social Influence 0.402 0.13 3.08 ** 
Habit 0.381 0.127 3.00 ** 
Experience -0.221 0.091 -2.43 * 
IV Tourist Profile 
Cognitive 
Distance 
0.198 0.064 3.10 ** 
Duration -0.133 0.046 -2.90 ** 
Date Flexibility 0.48 0.039 1.24 
Control Variables 
Total Trips 0.057 0.027 2.08 * 
Extraversion 0.284 0.157 1.81 
Agreeableness 0.268 0.152 1.76 
Conscientiousness 0.157 0.161 0.97 
Openness to 
Experience 
-0.126 0.175 -0.72 
Neuroticism -0.036 0.096 -0.38 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
0.468 0.176 2.65 ** 
Long Term 
Orientation 
-0.13 0.11 -1.17 
Gender 0.242 0.192 1.26 
Age -0.109 0.073 -1.48 
N=399, Log Likelihood = -639.22, Pseudo R2 = 
0.18 
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
Table 3. Ordered Logistic Regression on Expected Satisfaction 
Study 2 – Lab Experiment 
Having completed the survey, we proceeded to conducting a lab experiment, where we test our main 
hypotheses. We conducted the experiment with 105 students as subjects. As part of their participation in 
the experiment, the subjects were also asked to complete a questionnaire that included some of the items 
that were used in the pre-experiment survey, specifically those relating to user satisfaction and intention 
to use the system, as well as the items relating to the independent variables that were deemed significant 
in terms of influencing the dependent variable in the pre-experiment survey.  
The experiment took place between the 10th and 14th of March 2014. The 105 participants were split into 
smaller groups and invited to take a seat in a lecture room. Using their own smartphones they were asked 
to connect to the same Wi-Fi (in order to have similar network coverage and speed) and run the 
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experimental application. The application was web-based and was running in the browser of the 
participants, accessible via a link. The participants were given a short text detailing the functionalities of 
the application, the goal of the experiment (to book exactly one hotel room while making realistic and 
price-conscious bids), and a description of each type of auction. The experiment was split into 5 rounds, 
with each round having lasting 5 minutes. Users were given a one-minute break after each round was 
completed. After the first 3 rounds they were asked to fill out a survey concerning their satisfaction and 
their intention to use. The same survey was assigned again after the 5th round.  
The items for satisfaction and intention to use served as measures for use value, whereas the aggregate 
amount that users spent for booking a hotel room was used as a measure for the exchange value in the IS. 
In order to address hypotheses 1 through 3, as our main manipulation we introduced different methods of 
booking a hotel room. We split subjects into three groups and used the list price method as our baseline. 
Accordingly, the other two groups were in the ‘ascending bid’, and ‘descending bid’ conditions. The first 
three rounds were conducted for training users with the system, whereas the following two rounds 
introduced our second manipulation, where we varied the availability of rooms according to the number 
of users by +30% and -30%.  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of satisfaction, measured after the first three rounds. The 
satisfaction level for the Ascending bid auction as compared to the List Price approach is higher, as is the 
satisfaction in the case of the Descending bid auction. This finding suggests support for hypotheses H2a 
and H2b. Additionally, the satisfaction for the Descending bid auction is higher than the one for the 
Ascending bid auction, indicating support for hypothesis H3.  
Type of Auction/Pricing Respondents Satisfaction St.dev. 
List Price Approach 35 2.41 1.27 
Ascending Bid Auction 35 2.53 1.15 
Descending Bid Auction 35 2.71 1.05 
Table 4. Satisfaction by type of auction or pricing method 
Exchange value is examined in Table 5, which lists the average amount spent per room by auction/pricing 
method. The average amount paid in both the Ascending and Descending bid auctions is greater than the 
average amount spent in the List Price approach. The average amount spent in the Descending bid 
auction is around 60% greater than in the case of the Ascending bid auction. These findings suggest 
support for hypothesis H2. 
Type of Auction/Pricing Respondents Avg. Amount 
Spent 
St.dev. 
List Price Approach 35 54.24 9.38 
Ascending Bid Auction 35 58.07 11.89 
Descending Bid Auction 35 95.46 34.27 
Table 5. Amount spent by type of auction or pricing method 
Another interesting observation is the effect of the different type of auctions or pricing methods on the 
intention to use such a method. In Table 6 we see that both Ascending bid and Descending bid auctions 
perform better than the List Price approach, and that Ascending bid underperforms Descending bid.  
Type of Auction/Pricing Respondents Intention to 
use 
St.dev. 
List Price Approach 35 2.23 1.21 
Ascending Bid Auction 35 2.43 1.31 
Descending Bid Auction 35 2.63 1.29 
Table 6. Intention to use by type of auction or pricing method 
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When analyzing the effect of occupancy rate, as measured after the last two rounds, we observe that 
satisfaction drops after the manipulation mainly for the First high, then low type of manipulation (Table 
7). The “First low, then high supply” manipulation refers to the fact that in round 4 the participants faced 
inadequate supply (more participants than rooms) and in round 5 they had abundant supply (more rooms 
than participants). The “First high, then low supply” manipulation is the reversed order.  
Occupancy rate Satisfaction Respondents Satisfaction St.dev. 
First low, then high 
supply 
Before manipulation 53 2.76 1.22 
 After manipulation 53 2.53 1.17 
First high, then low 
supply 
Before manipulation 52 2.34 1.06 
 After manipulation 52 2.33 1.20 
Table 7. Effect of supply rate on satisfaction 
When measuring the effect of occupancy rate on the exchange value, we notice that the descending bid 
auction has higher average amounts in the case of high occupancy (Table 8), suggesting support for 
hypothesis H4b.  
Type of Auction/Pricing Low Supply High Supply 
List Price Approach 60.61 60.12 
Ascending Bid Auction 64.71 64.3 
Descending Bid Auction 104.22 82.11 
Table 8. Average amount paid by type of auction/pricing approach and occupancy rate 
Study 3 – Field Experiment 
While the complete analysis of Study 2 is still pending, at the same time we are currently conducting an 
additional field experiment with the same manipulations and number of repetitions in order to increase 
the validity of the results of in the lab experiment while overcoming some of the potential limitations of 
the lab experiment setting. In particular, during the lab experiment we discovered that in some instances 
the system was slow and error-prone, and we were able to fix the respective bugs for the field study. 
Second, during the lab experiment, subjects were able to see their competitors and could potentially 
assess their competition by counting the number of users against whom they were bidding. Finally, a field 
experiment was deemed more realistic, as each repetition lasted for 12 hours (from 8am to 8 pm). In 
contrast, subjects in the lab experiments had a time span of 3 minutes to complete their bidding, which 
could also act as a source of potential bias, given that in real instances of online auctions, all users do not 
necessarily overlap at the same point in time.  
Conclusion 
The studies appear to be promising in providing empirical support for the concepts of use and exchange 
value in a competitive, rather than collaborative community. Full hypothesis testing results will be 
available by the time the conference in New Zealand is held, but so far the results appear to indicate that 
both types of value are enhanced by making use of auctions rather than list pricing. Therefore, 
collaboration has perhaps been over-rated in its impact and usefulness for all forms of VCs, and further 
research should be undertaken to (1) compare a wider array of auction types and (2) discover other 
community models that should be considered when choosing models of cooperation and competition. 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to acknowledge that this research project was funded by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation: Project Number 100018_143392. 
General IS Topics 
10 Thirty Fifth International Conference on Information Systems, Auckland 2014  
References 
Amit, R., and Zott, C. 2001. “Value creation in e‐business,” Strategic Management Journal, (22:6‐7), 
pp.493-520. 
Bhattacherjee, A., and Premkumar, G. 2004. “Understanding changes in belief and attitude toward 
information technology usage: a theoretical model and longitudinal test,” MIS Quarterly, (28:2), 
pp.229-54. 
Bieber, M., Engelbart, D., Furuta, R., Hiltz, S.R., Noll, J., Preece, J., Stohr, E.A., Turoff, M., and Van De 
Welle, B. 2002. “Toward Virtual Community Knowledge Evolution,” Journal of Management 
Information Systems, (18:4), pp. 11-35. 
Bowman, C., and Ambrosini, V. 2000. “Value creation versus value capture: towards a coherent definition 
of value in strategy,” British Journal of Management, (11:1), pp.1-15. 
Herzschlag, M. and Zwick, R. 2002. “Internet auctions – popular and professional literature review,” 
Quarterly Journal of Electronic Commerce, (1:2), pp.161-186.  
Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values. Sage. 
Ivanova‐Stenzel, R., and Salmon, T. C. 2004. “Bidder preferences among auction institutions,” Economic 
Inquiry, (42:2), pp.223-236. 
John, O. P., Naumann, L. P., and Soto, C. J. 2008. “Paradigm shift to the integrative big five trait 
taxonomy,” Handbook of personality: Theory and research, (3), pp.114-158. 
Kersten, G. E., Chen, E., Neumann, D., Vahidov, R., and Weinhardt, C. 2008. On comparison of 
mechanisms of economic and social exchanges: the times model. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
Klemperer, P. 2002. “What really matters in auction design,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
(16:1), pp.169-189. 
Lepak, D. P., Smith, K. G., and Taylor, M. S. 2007. “Value creation and value capture: a multilevel 
perspective,” Academy of Management Review, (32:1), pp.180-194. 
Oliver, R.L. 1980. “A cognitive model of the antecedents and consequences of satisfaction decisions,” 
Journal of Marketing Research, (17), pp.460-469. 
Ortiz de Guinea, A., and Markus, M. L. 2009. “Why Break the Habit of a Lifetime? Rethinking the Roles of 
Intention, Habit, and Emotion in Continuing Information Technology Use,” MIS Quarterly, (33:3), 
pp.433-444. 
Porter, C. E. 2004. “A typology of virtual communities: A multi‐disciplinary foundation for future 
research,” Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, (10:1). 
Porter, C. E., and Donthu, N. 2008. “Cultivating trust and harvesting value in virtual communities,” 
Management Science, (54:1), pp.113-128. 
Rockoff, T. E., and Groves, M. 1995. “Design of an Internet-based system for remote Dutch auctions,” 
Internet Research, (5:4), pp.10-16. 
Sutanto, J., Kankanhalli, A., and Tan, B.C.Y. 2011. “Eliciting a Sense of Virtual Community among 
Knowledge Contributors,” ACM Trans. Management Inform. Systems (1:9), p.14. 
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M. G., Davis, G. B., and Davis, F. D. 2003. “User Acceptance of Information 
Technology: Toward a Unified View,” MIS Quarterly, (27:3), pp.425-478. 
Yen, C-H., and Lu, H-P. 2008. “Factors Influencing online auction repurchase intention,” Internet 
Research, (18:1), pp.7-25. 
Yoo, B., Donthu, N., and Lenartowicz, T. 2011. "Measuring Hofstede’s Fife Dimentions of Cultural Values 
at the Individual Level: Development and Validation of CVSCALE," Journal of International 
Consumer Marketing, (23:3-4), pp.193-210. 
